The Law of Interstate Placements of Children by Weiland, Kurt H. & White, Joseph L.
The Law of Interstate Placements of Children
KURT H. WEILAND AND JOSEPH L. WHITE*
The interstate placement of children is a practice of obscure and
virtually unexamined legality. In practice, courts and executive agencies,
through their official decisions and informal concurrence, send children
across state boundaries for placement in facilities and institutions far from
their home communities. Basic questions concerning the legality of this
practice appear to have been asked only infrequently. Do courts and
executive agencies have authority to send children out of their home states?
Even if legislatures have granted such authority, are there constitutional
impediments to the practice? What certainty do sending states have that
their out-of-state placement orders will be honored in receiving states?
And what continuing legal control-beyond mere cessation of subsidies
and payments-can a sending state exercise over a child in a receiving
state? While the focus of this paper is on interstate placements by officials,
it also provides a conspectus of the applicable law for attorneys
representing children or families who may be affected by such placements,
whether official or unofficial. It summarizes the legal basis on which
interstate placements might be made or challenged.
The law of interstate placements easily divides itself into two parts.
One part, considered in this article, includes court decisions and statutes
that relate to interstate child placement practices. The other part is
composed of those interstate compacts that attempt to give some
regularity to the practices of interstate placements.' The use of compacts
has been commented on extensively.2
Ohio law affecting interstate placements'is broadly similar to the law
of most other states. Like most jurisdictions, Ohio is a member of the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,3 the Interstate Compact
on Juveniles,4 and the Interstate Compact on Mental Health.5 Ohio also
* Members, Ohio Bar. Mr. Weiland is a clerk to the Licking County (Ohio) Juvenile and Probate
Court; Mr. White is Senior Fellow in Social Policy, the Academy for Contemporary Problems,
Columbus, Ohio. This article was adapted from THE INTERSTATE PLACEMUNT OF CjnuL .N: A
PRELIMINARY REPORT (1978) by permission of the Council of State Governments. Work was
conducted under a federal grant. United States Department of Justice, Ofice of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, Grant No. 77 JN-99-0021.
1. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS 1783-1977 (1977):
INTERSTATE COMPACT ON JUVENILES (delinquents who are either placed on probation or parole or
runaway children who are being returned); INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENt.% OF CHILDREN
(children placed in certain types of out-of-state residential facilities); and MENTAL HEALTH COMPAcT
(interinstitutional transfers resulting from relocation of patients' families).
2. Id.; COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE LAW AND USES OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1976);
M. RIDGEWAY, INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1971); R. LEACH & R. SUGG, JR., THE ADMiNtSTjtATioN OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1959).
3. OIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5103.20-.28 (Page Supp. 1977).
4. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.56-.61 (Page 1976).
. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5123.63-.66 (Page 1970).
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has a child importation statute regulating the placement of children who
are brought into the state for placement "in a family home or with an
agency or institution. 6  And, like several other states, Ohio has a
constitutional prohibition of the out-of-state transportation of persons for
offenses committed in Ohio.7 Ohio's law is unusual in one respect; it gives
specific statutory authority for some interstate placements to the Ohio
juvenile courts and the Ohio Youth Commission.8 The statutes of most
states do not expressly authorize interstate placements.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF INTERSTATE PLACEMENTS
Courts are increasingly being asked to rule on the legality of state
practices that result in the placement of children from one state in
institutions located in another. Specific constitutional issues raised
include infringements of due process, equal protection, right to treatment,
and first amendment associational interests. Several state constitutions
contain provisions, not yet invoked in challenges to interstate placements,
that might be applicable to official placements of delinquent or status
offenders. Several state constitutions prohibit the out-of-state transpor-
tation of persons convicted of offenses within the states.
One recent case, Gary W. v. Louisiana,9 resulted in the removal of all
Louisiana youths who had been placed in Texas institutions. Gary W.
was a class action brought on behalf of Louisiana children who either had
been placed in Texas by the direct .action of Louisiana state officials or
whose placements were financially supported by the state government.
The plaintiffs claimed that the Texas placements deprived them of
treatment rights to which they were entitled under the Constitution and
federal statutes, and further asserted that "the mere fact of their placement
in out-of-state facilities is itself a denial of adequate treatment and
therefore violates federal statutory and constitutional rights."' °
To support their claim that out-of-state placements were illegal, the
plaintiffs asserted that the "primary objective of institutional treatment
must be the reintegration of children into their families and home
communities ... :11
The family of a child placed in residential treatment in Louisiana has
the opportunity to participate in the child's treatment program and life by
visiting the child and having the child make day or overnight visits
home. . . .When institutional care is required, it should be afforded near
the parents' home; its goal must be the return of the child to the home; and
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.39 (Page 1976).
7. OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 12.
8. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.353-.355 (Page 1976); OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5139.06 (Page
1970 & Supp. 1977).
9. 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
10. Id. at 1213.
I1. Id. at 1215.
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the placement of the child must be in accordance with the inexorable
application of "least restrictive alternative": that is, the kind of treatment
that is both nearest the home and imposes the least of all possible
restrictions on the child's freedom.
12
The Gary W. court decided the case on "right to treatment" principles,
an evolving concept of constitutional law. Cases that concern the right to
treatment are premised on due process and equal protection grounds and
eighth amendment principles. Typically, the-cases arise when the state
exercises custodial powers over an individual and restricts his liberties.
The statutory rationale underpinning the state's assumption of custodial
powers is the individuars need for some type of treatment, rehabilitation,
or therapeutic services. For the most part, the right to treatment cases
involve mental patients, prisoners and itistitutionalized juveniles. 13
When courts have held that individuals have a right to treatment the
right has been approached as a quid pro quo: if the state justifies
restrictions on an individual's liberties by his need for services, then the
state must provide the needed services as long as the liberties are restricted.
If the state does not or cannot provide the services, it loses its legal basis
for restrictions upon liberty.'
4
The right to treatment is likely to take on interstate aspects when the
sending state has very limited specialized treatment resources, or when
neither the sending nor the receiving state can supply the required
treatment. In an interstate right to treatment case, other peripheral issues,
such as a court's or executive agency's legal authority to make such
placements, are likely to overshadow the right to treatment issue.'5
While the right to treatment has chiefly been used to procure
appropriate treatment for an individual without regard to state
boundaries, the Gary W. case was an attempt to use the principle to
withdraw children from placements. Even though the Gary W. court
granted the plaintiffs relief, it did not hold that the right to treatment,
federal law, or the Constitution imposes a blanket prohibition on out-of-
state placements. The Gary W. court held:
What is required is that the state give thoughtful consideration to the needs of
the individual, treating him constructively and in accordance with his own
situation, rather than automatically placing in institutions, perhaps far from
home and perhaps forever, all for whom families cannot care and all who are
rejected by family or society.' 6
12. Id.
13. Eg., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
App. 1966) (amended 1967); Wyattv. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5thCir. 1974); Martarellav. Keley, 349
F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (D.C. Ala. 1971).
14. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. La. 1976).
15. See In re Dennis M., 82 Misc. 2d 802,370 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1975); State ex rel. F.D., 138 N.J.
Super. 383,351 A.2d 43 (1975); State ex reL Juv. Dept. Multnomah Countyv. L, 24 Or. App. 257, 546
P.2d 153 (1976).
16. 437 F. Supp. at 1217.
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The court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that legal principles forbade
Louisiana officials from placing children in Texas institutions and required
them to place children in their own communities.
[T]he a priori thesis that Texas and all other states than Louisiana are
tainted must be rejected. Each child must receive proper care wherever that
child is placed. What is proper must be determined separately for each
child based on that child's personal attributes and needs. What is proper
for a particular child includes consideration not only of whether the child
should be placed in an institution or treated in the community; it also
includes consideration of the kind and geographic location of the institution
or place of treatment.1
7
Throughout the Gary W. decision, interstate placements are
described as affecting a child's relationship with his family and home
community. 8 In interstate placements at a great distance, a geographic
impediment is placed between a child and his family and friends. One
early mention of a child's associational interests with his family and friends
is suggested in In re Gault,'9 where the conditions that give rise to due
process rights were found to include confinement in institutions that
remove a child from "mother and father and sisters and brothers and
friends and classmates. 20 Similarly, Morales v. Turman2' criticizes the
use of Texas juvenile institutions that remove juveniles great distances
from their home communities.
The argument has been made that a person's relationship with family
and friends is a constitutionally protected associational interest,2 but the
interest has not been found strong enough to preclude state action that
disrupts a person's relationship with family and friends. Much court
action, particularly in the juvenile area, necessarily involves interference
with family relationships. Dependency and neglect statutes presume that
a court must interfere with a child's family relationship for his own
protection. Similarly, incarceration always interferes with an inmate's
relationship with family and friends.
Another recent case, Sinhogar v. Parry,2 tests the authority of New
York officials to place youths in out-of-state facilities. The Sinhogar
plaintiffs have alleged four constitutional defects in New York interstate
placement practices. First, the particular placements constitute denials of
17. Id. at 1219.
18. Id. at 1215, 1219.
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Id. at 27.
21. 383 F. Supp. 53, 115-18 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on procedural grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th
Cir. 1976), rev'dper curiam, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
22. See Sinnett v. Mountain Mission School, I FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2170 (U.S.D.C. Western
D., Va., Docket No. 75-0306 1975); Park v. Thompson, 356 F. Supp. 783, 789 (D.C. Hawaii 1973)
(citing with approval Capitan v. Cupp, 356 F. Supp. 302 (D.C. Ore. 1972)); Rebideau v. Stoneman,
398 F. Supp. 805, 809, 814 (D.C. Vt. 1975).
23. No. 14138/77 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, filed July 26, 1977).
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plaintiffs' right to treatment guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment;24
second, to send plaintiffs to out-of-state facilities, away from family and
community, without a hearing to determine the appropriateness of the
placements violates the fourteenth amendment.25 The third and fourth
constitutional defects alleged by the plaintiffs are that the New York
plaintiffs outside the State, and granting out-of-state placement hearings
to delinquent youth but not to dependent children constitute a denial
of equal protection.26
In addition to due process and equal protection claims, the plaintiffs'
complaint challenges out-of-state placements because the institutions
involved "are not authorized agencies as defined in Social Services Law §
371 (10),,,27 and "are not visited, inspected or supervised by the New York
State Board of Social Welfare."28 Other defects of the placements cited in
the complaint include noncompliance of the out-of-state facilities with
New York standards for child-care institutions, failure to assure that the
programs are appropriate for each child's needs, and by implication, the
discouragement of the development of appropriate facilities within New
York. If ultimately decided on the basis of the New York statute, Sin-
hogar will transcend its precedential authority for New York and provide
direction for understanding other states' statutes that authorize official
placements.
A final constitutional issue that may influence interstate placements
is found in special provisions of state constitutions. Several state
constitutions prohibit the out-of-state transportation of persons convicted
of offenses within the state.29 In some states, a constitutional limitation is
expressed in archaic terms of "outlawry," "banishment," or "exile." 30 No
cases appear to have been brought to determine whether such provisions
affect a court's or an executive agency's authority to place a child beyond
state borders following a status or delinquency adjudication.
II. AUTHORITY FOR COURT-ORDERED
OUT-OF-STATE PLACEMENTS
Most juvenile court statutes provide a wide range of dispositional
options, irrespective of the type of adjudication. Typically, the court is
given options ranging from home placements to institutional commit-
ments. Equally typically, these dispositional alternatives are not
24. Id. at 18.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 19.
21. Id. at 17.
28. Id.
29. ILL. CONST. art. 1,.§ 11; NE. CONsT. art. 1, § 15; OHIo CoNsr. art. 1, § 12; uKLA. CoNsr. art.
2, § 29; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 8;TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 20; VT. CONsr. ch. 1, art. 21; W. VA. CONST. nit. 3,
§ 5.
30. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 30; ARK. CoNsr. art. 2, § 21; GA. CONST. art. 1,§ 1; MD. CoNS?. art.23;
MAss. CONsr. pt. 1, art. 12; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art 15; N.C. CosT. art. 1, § 19.
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identified by any geographical limitations restricting court placements to
within state borders.
Can a court commit a youth to an out-of-state facility, absent specific
statutory authorization? The few older court decisions on the question do
not permit courts to make such out-of-state placements, while the more
recent decisions tend toward construing court dispositional authority as
broadly as possible in these situations. One 1947 Missouri case, In re
Church,3 held that a court could not commit a youth to an out-of-state
institution under a statute that was ambiguous on the point. Similarly, a
former Michigan statute was interpreted by the state attorney general not
to authorize out-of-state placements. Referring to the general powers of
a court apart from a specific statute, one Pennsylvania court held that:
the action of the [trial] court, in placing a child under the jurisdiction and
subject to the laws of another state and in the control of an institution not
responsible to the court making the order or the laws of this Commonwealth.
cannot be sustained. 3
More recently, courts that have decided cases under statutes as
unspecific as those considered by the Michigan Attorney General and the
Church court have taken a more expansive view of juvenile court
placement authority. Three recent cases involving out-of-state place-
ments broadly interpret judicial authority to make placements.34
The statutory authority to place a youth in "some other suitable
place" is a dispositional power common to juvenile court laws. "Suitable"
might be construed either to include or exclude out-of-state placements.
Two cases have held that a juvenile court may make interstate placements
under such broad statutory wording. In Reyna v. Department of
Institutions, Social and Rehabilitation Services,35 an Oklahoma court
construed its statutory powers to place a dependent child "in custody of a
suitable person elsewhere 36 to give it authority to choose between homes
in Texas and France. The court assumed, without examination, that a
significant difference between the two competing placements was that
Oklahoma would lose continuing supervisory jurisdiction over the child
only if the placement were into the French home. The court nevertheless
decided to place the child in the French home.
The second case involved a Georgia statute that permitted placements
in other suitable places.37 Georgia had also enacted the Uniform Juvenile
31. 204 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. App. 1947).
32. 1946 Op. ATey GEN. No. 0-4543 (Mich. 1946).
33. Commonwealth ex rel. Lembeck v. Lembeck, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 305, 308, (1924).
34. State ex rel. D.F., 138 N.J. Super, 383,351 A.2d 43 (1975); In re Dennis M., 82 Misc. 2d 802,
370 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1975); State ex rel. Juy. Dept. of Multnomah County v. L., 240 Or. App. 257, 546
P.2d 153 (1976).
35. 546 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1976).
36. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1116 (West 1966).
37. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-2301 to 2302 (1976).
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Courts Act, which has specific provisions authorizing out-of-state
placements. 38 The court in In re A.S.39 acknowledged that out-of-state
placements could be made by a juvenile court under either statute.
A. Statutes with Specific Geographic Limitations
For the most part, dispositional statutes are silent on the question of
geographic limitations; a few states, however, do have relevant laws that
circumscribe the dispositional powers of juvenile courts in geographic
terms. Indiana is unusual in limiting a court's dispositional powers to
either institutions "incorporated or organized under the laws of the
state,'AO or to "child placing agencies in the state willing to receive such
wardship."4' The one exception to these geographic limitations is that an
Indiana court is permitted to approve a public or charitable guardian's
request for a change of a ward's residence to another state.42 Although
courts in certain other states may place children out of state, agencies
having custody or guardianship may not do so without court approval.
Statutory authority requiring juvenile court approval for out-of-state
placements is found in Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming.43 In these states, even
if the juvenile court commits a youth to a private agency that later decides
to place the youth out of state, the agency must return to the court and
obtain its consent to the foreign placement.
B. Statutes with Specific Authority to Place Out of State
States that have enacted the Uniform Juvenile Courts Act, or
variations on it, such as Georgia, Louisiana, North Dakota, and
Tennessee, permit their courts fairly wide and detailed authority regarding
out-of-state dispositions." Portions of this Uniform Act attempt to
address the problem presented when the family of a child who is under the
court's jurisdiction plans to relocate to another state.45
The Uniform Act also permits a court to make out-of-state
placements to a "suitable person in another state.'"46  An interesting
feature of this provision is that if the other state has also enacted the
38. Id. § 24A-3003.
39. 140 Ga. App. 65, 232 S.E.2d 145 (1977).
40. IND. CODE ANN. § 21-5-2-1 (Burns 1975).
41. Id. § 31-5-7-15(2)-31-5-7-15(3).
42. Id. § 29-1-18-8. It is unclear from the wording whether this statute applies to all guardians
appointed by Indiana courts, or merely to "probate" guardians. For a fuller discussion, see text
accompanying notes 78-80 infra.
43. IDAHO CODE § 16-1814(3) (Supp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-42 (1977); Wyo. STAT. §
14-1 15.30(a)(vi)(Supp. 1975).
44. GA. CODE ANN. §24A-1 to 40 (1976 & Supp. 1977); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1561.1 (West
1976); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-01 to 59 (1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-201 to 281 (1973).
45. Kg., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3001 (1976).
46. Eg., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1571.7 (West 1968).
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Uniform Act, the sending court may request the juvenile court in the
receiving state to assign a probation officer or other official to supervise the
child in placement. The Uniform Act makes no reference to the use of
interstate compacts. As a matter of practice, reciprocal supervision takes
place in most states, irrespective of the adoption of the Uniform Act,
usually through a compact, despite the authority of the courts under the
Uniform Act to make such placements directly.
A third feature of the Uniform Act that may be applicable to out-of-
state placements is the recognition given to receiving state probation
officers and other officials to visit, counsel, control, direct, take into
custody, and return children to the court of original jurisdiction.47 This
last provision of the Uniform Act is, in effect, a grant of comity for the
discretionary decisions of the respective state probation officers.
A common statutory provision permits juvenile courts to place a
youth out of state if the facility is licensed by an agency in the receiving
state "analogous" to the agency which licenses such facilities in the sending
state. 4' North Carolina permits its juvenile courts to place out of state
when th& placement will result in the return of a nonresident child to his
home state.49 Missouri juvenile courts are permitted to place ajuvenile in
an out-of-state association, school, or institution if the receiving state's
agency that oversees the importation of children gives its approval.50
Oregon has one of the more detailed statutes authorizing out-of-state
dispositions. The Oregon statute permits such dispositions when there is
an applicable interstate compact, an agreement with another state, or "an
informal arrangement" with another state that permits the child to reside
there while on probation or under protective supervision, or to be placed in
an institution or with an agency in another state.51
III. EXECUTIVE AGENCY AUTHORITY TO MAKE
OUT-OF-STATE PLACEMENTS
Like statutes that conferjuvenile court powers, statutes that authorize
local and state executive agency placements seldom mention geographical
limitations. As an example, Nebraska's Department of Correctional
Services is permitted to "use other public facilities or contract for the use of
private facilities for the care and treatment of children in its legal
custody." 52 Whether this language, typical of statutory descriptions of
executive agency placement authority, permits out..of-state placements is
47. UNIFORM JUVENILE CouRTs AcT §.
48. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1814(3) (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STA'r. § 62.200(1)(b) (1972); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1116(a)(2) (West 1966).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-286(2)(c) (1967).
50. Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.181(2)(c) (1976).
51. OR. REv. STAT. § 419.507 (1977).
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-108.04 (1975).
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not clear. Curiously, Nebraska has subsequent statutory language that
seems to indicate that out-of-state placements are authorized, or at least
not forbidden. Still referring to the Department of Correctional Services,
the statute continues: "Placement of children in private or public facilities
not under its jurisdiction shall not terminate the legal custody of the
department."53 This wording is ambiguous; the reference to "not under its
jurisdiction" might signify geography or the Department's lack of
authority over private facilities, or a division of authority among several
state departments that share responsibility for children's services.
Another Nebraska statute that concerns the Department of
Correctional Services refers specifically to placements out of state. Inthis
statute, the Department is authorized to place a person in an institution "in
another jurisdiction" or send him "to an out-of-state institution. '" 5 4
Whether these two phrases should be read in pari materia is not clear.
Geographic reference of laws that confer out-of-state placement
authority on executive agencies may be clear or ambiguous. Louisiana
and Vermont have ambiguous geographical references in their laws. In
Louisiana, the Division of Youth Services, assigned to develop a regional
system of child-caring institutions, is directed to establish them "in or near
places in the state."55  Vermont, with equal ambiguity, permits the
Commissioner of Corrections (for delinquent children) and the Commis-
sioner of Social and Rehabilitation Services (for children in need of
supervision) to place children in "private or public agencies of the
community where their assistance appears to be needed or desirable."5 6
Alaska and Connecticut have specific authority for executive agency
out-of-state placements. Alaska's Department of Health and Social
Services is empowered "to arrange for care of every child inside or outside
the state."" Connecticut authorizes its Commissioner of Children and
Youth Services to transfer children "to any appropriate resource or
program administered or available to the department."58 The Commis-
sioner of Social Services is authorized to "make reciprocal agreements
with other states and with agencies outside the state in matters relating to
the supervision of the welfare of children."5 9
Michigan is unusual in that the executive department is authorized to
make both interstate and international placements. The statute
authorizes the department to "place a state ward in a public or private
agency incorporated under the laws of another state or country and
53. Id.
54. Id. § 83-175.
55. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:1092 (West 1976).
56. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 638 (1959).
57. ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.230 (1975).
58. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-420 (1975).
59. Id. § 17-32(g).
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approved or licensed by the other state or country." ' Missouri's Division
of Youth is authorized to place out of state when it appears that plans for a
child's rehabilitation have been made in some other state and that parents
and the director of the Division have given their approval to such
61placement.
Delaware's Division of Social Services is given limited out-of-state
placement authority when it concludes that a dependent child is
improperly placed. Although the statute is not specific, it appears that this
power only applies to children who were brought into the state under its
importation statute.62 In other words, this authority is apparently only
for replacement.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL RECOGNITION OF COURT
DISPOSITIONAL ORDERS
Whether or not judges and other officials have specific statutory
authority to make out-of-state placements, such placements are made.
Beyond the basic question of authority to make these placements, other
questions arise concerning their legal effect. Are sending-state orders
enforceable in a receiving state? Must a receiving state accord recognition
to subsequent orders from the sending state? These questions raise
unresolved legal issues of comity and full faith and credit. In a recent case,
State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County v. L.,6" the
Oregon Court of Appeals brushed aside the question of out-of-state
enforceability:
Any question concerning the court's authority to exercise continuing
jurisdiction over L by ordering her placement in the Chazen Institute [an
out-of-state facility] is put to rest by the legislature's 1973 amendment to
ORS 419.507 which provides:
"Commitment of a child to the Children's Services Division does not
terminate the court's continuin jurisdiction to protect the rights of the child
or his parents or guardians.
Older cases, rather than ignoring jurisdictional questions and treating
out-of-state placements as problems of statutory authorization, more
directly addressed the issues of comity and full faith and credit.65
A. Comity
Comity is a legal principle that permits the courts of one jurisdiction
60. MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 25.399.54 (1967); see also ILL. REV. STAT. tit. 23, § 2226(a) (1967),
61. Mo. REV. STAT. § 219.086 (1976).
62. DEL. CODE tit. 31, § 352 (1974).
63. 24 Or. App. 257, 546 P.2d 153 (1976).
64. Id. at 267, 546 P.2d at 159.
65. Commonwealth exrel. Lembeckv. Lembeck, 83 Pa. Super. Ct. 305 (1924); Butler v. Butler,
83 N.H. 413, 143 A. 471 (1928).
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to recognize and enforce rights created in another jurisdiction when there
is no overriding reason for withholding such recognition. Rules ofcomity
are made both by courts and legislatures. When legislatures statutorily
define the recognition that courts may accord to out-of-state judgments,
they have legislated rules of comity. One typical reason for not applying
the principle of comity to a foreign judgment is that the foreign decree is
inconsistent with the policy or substantive law of the enforcing
jurisdiction. Another reason is simply that the decreeing court in the
foreign state was without authority to render the judgment sought to be
enforced. Comity is not based upon constitutional law, but is an
outgrowth of common law and international law doctrines that define the
inherent powers of courts and legislatures."
Judicial comity in interstate placements is discussed in Butler v.
Butler.67 In that case a child was transferred by court order to an out-of-
state third party, as part of a divorce proceeding. One of the child's
parents challenged the order for want of statutory authority for out-of-
state placements. The court rejected this challenge but considered
whether the court might lose jurisdiction over a child who had been placed
out of state:
The hazards of ineffective enforcement arising from the mere change of a
ward's residence to another state are not such as to prevent the court from
giving fullest force and consideration to the child's greatest welfare, which,
as we have seen, is always the paramount and determining factor ...Itis
unnecessary to consider whether a decree for the custody of a minor .. is
a judgment within the protection of the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal Constitution ...; it is sufficient that, under the principles of
comity customarily exercised among the states, the courts of each will
give appropriate force to the official character of a custodian appoint-
ed in another state and recognize him, in the absence of changed
conditions. 6
66. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws §§ 4-7 (1964); 14A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 3 (1974).
67. Butler v. Butler, 83 N.H. 413, 143 A. 471 (1928).
68. Id. at 415, 143A. at 473. See also Watkins v. Brannon, 54 Ala. App. 424,309 So. 2d 464
(1974), cert. denied,293 Ala. 778,309 So.2d468 (1975). Commonwcalthexrel. Lembeckv. Lembeck,
83 Pa. Super. Ct. 305 (1924), involved an interstate placement similar to the placement in Btiler. One
of the parents challenged the order's legality on the basis "that the child has been committed to an
institution not within the jurisdiction of the courts and that, therefore, the order is unauthorized and
legally inoperative." The Lembeck court agreed with the parent:
mhe institution to which this child was committed is not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court making the order. It is not bound to comply with the order, nor if it undertake so to do
is it subject to the control or direction of the court with reference to the manner in which the
appointment shall be exercised. The authority of every tribunal is restricted by the territorial
limits of the state in which it is establishled and any attempt to exercise authority outside of
those limits must be regarded as an illegal assumption of power, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714. The child in ihis instance is in a sense a ward of the court; she is within the State of
Pennsylvania; she is entitled to the protection which the laws of this Stategiveher, and while
the orderwas doubtless made wholly in the interest of the child and with regard to herwelfare,
the action of the court, placing her under the jurisdiction and subject to the laws of another
state and in the control of an institution not responsible to the court making the order or the
laws of this Commonwealth, cannot be sustained. As no tribunal established by this State
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An example of comity legislation that is applidable to out-of-state
placements of juveniles is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. A
principle motivation for drafting this Act was the desire to reconcile the
conflicting decisions that had developed in case law concerning the
recognition of foreign child custody determinations generated by divorce
and other post-marital disputes. 9
The Act permits jurisdiction for child custody determination if: (1) the
state in which the deciding court sits is the child's home state; (2) the child
and other parties to the issues have a significant connection to the state and
there is substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships available in the state; (3)
the child is present in the state and there is an emergency requiring the
court to take action for his protection; or (4) no other state could take
jurisdiction under the statute.70
The significance of this Act for out-of-state placements of children is
that it provides an orderly set of rules of comity that will permit a sending
state court to anticipate what recognition will be given to its orders
affecting the custody of a child in out-of-state placement. Nineteen states
have enacted this Uniform Act.7'
Another statutory basis for the extension of comity to official
placements can be found in child import/ export statutes. These statutes,
discussed in. detail below, 72 are found in a majority of states. They
effectively provide legislative grants of comity to court and executive
agency interstate placements, although the case law does not acknowledge
can extend its process beyond its own territory so as to subject persons to its decisions, the
result of the order complained of is to place the child in crn institution over whose
management the committing court has no control and to remit the contending parents to a
foreign jurisdiction for the determination of a question lawfully submitted to a court of
competent jurisdiction."
Id. at 307-08.
The Lembeck decision is based on jurisdictional principles that ave changed significantly since
1924. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). Absent some jurisdictional authority to make an interstate placement or to appoint an out-of-
state custodian, however, Lembeck could yield the same result today as it did in 1924. Similarly, tile
Butler court's discussion of comity is still a valid statement of the applicable law. The decisions are
interesting because, faced with questions concerning interstate placements, the two courts, applying
different principles, reached contradictory conclusions regarding the lezality of the placements. Inthe
forty years since the two decisions, there has been no definitive resolution ofthejurisdictional questions
faced by those courts.
69. B. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 3 FAmt. L. Q., 304-16 (1969).
The text of the Act can be found at 317-30 following the article.
70. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3.
71. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-.910 (1975); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5150.01-74 (West 1962); CoLo,
REV. STAT. §§ 14-13-101 to 126 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 13, §§ 1901-1925; FLA. STAT. ANN, §§ 61.1302-
.1348 (West 1969); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 583-1 to 26 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 5-1001 to 25 (1967); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-11.6-1 to 24 (Bums 1975); IOWA CODE §§ 598A.1-.25 (1971); MD. ANN. CODa art,
16, §§ 164-207 (1973); MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 27A.651-.673 (1967); MINN. STAT. §§ 518A.0l.-.25
(1960); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 48-331 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE§§ 14-14-01 to 26 (1971); OlIO R V.
CODE ANN. §§ 3109.21-.37 (Page Supp. 1977); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 109.70)-.930 (1977); PA. CoNs. STAT.
tit. 11, §§ 2301-2325 (1969); Wis. STAT. §§ 822.01-.25 (1977); Wyo. SrAT. §§ 20-143 to 167 (1977).
72. See text accompanying notes 86-108 infra.
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that function. The clearest example is the Wyoming importation statute,
which is applied to every "person, firm, partnership, corporation, state or
political subdivision or agency thereof," bringing or sending children into
Wyoming.73 For interstate placement decisions to be recognized in
Wyoming, officials in other states must only comply with Wyoming's
notice and reporting requirements. Wyoming is unusual in its specific
reference to governmental placements.
A few other state importation laws contain language that might
permit specific recognition of other states' official placements. The
Delaware statute is applied to "[a]ny person, institution, agency,
association, corporation, bureau, board or commission outside Dela-
ware." 74 The Oregon statute is applied to a "person, agent, agency or
institution of another state."'" South Dakota applies its law to agencies
"operating under the laws of another state. 7 6 Most import/ export laws,
however, are ambiguous in their applicability to official interstate
placements.
Another area in which rules of comity affect interstate placements is
the recognition accorded guardians appointed in sister states. Comity in
this area is a mix of common law and statutes. While the development of
comity -principles that apply to guardians and wards has occurred
independently of the import/ export statutes, in most states both sets of
comity principles may be equally applicable to interstate placements.
This is likely because the parties concerned with interstate placements will
typically have guardian status of one sort or another. The difficulty in
determining whether to apply the guardianship comity rules in an interstate
placement arises from the diverse meanings attached to the phrases
"guardian and ward" and "ward of the court."
In most states, a youth can become a "ward" by court order following
either of two judicial procedures. One process is application to a probate
court by a third party for letters of guardianship. Typically, these
applications are special statutory proceedings independent of delinquency,
status offense, neglect, or dependency proceedings. A second court
process that results in the appointment of a guardian for a child can follow
juvenile court proceedings. Typically, an adjudicated delinquent or
dependent child is referred to as a "ward of the court" and the person or
facility receiving custody of the child is called his "guardian."
The rights and duties that are imposed on a guardian for the care and
custody of a child under either process are probably not significantly
different (except as they relate to liability for costs of maintenance of the
child and conservancy of his estate). It is not clear, however, whether the
73. Wyo. STAT. § 14-4-109 (1977).
74. Di. CODE tit. 31, § 307 (1974).
75. OR. REV. STAT. § 418.290 (1977).
76. S.D. CoMpast, LAws ANN. § 26-6-10 (1976).
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recognition accorded the guardianship of wards placed out of state is
identical for appointments under each procedure.
One case, Pfotenhauer v. Hunter," indicates when a court will
recognize a guardianship created in another state. After denying the
applicability of an interstate compact as a vehilce for returning the ward to
Nevada, the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed, in dicta, that:
Petitioner [the guardian] voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of the
Nevada Court, she sought and obtained letters of guardianship and
accepted the trust and responsibility the Court reposed in her to faithfully
execute her duties as guardian. She is now estopped from denying that
jurisdiction which she invoked. . . . Neither is Petitioner able to divest
that court ofjurisdiction over the guardianship by removing herself and the
child from the territorial limits and refusing to return because her removal
from Nevada was fraudulent.78
When an out-of-state facility accepts a placement from a court and is
appointed guardian, the principle suggested by the Oklahoma Court might
be applicable to subject the facility, as guardian, to orders-from the sending
court: the guardian's voluntary acceptance of the court's appointment
enables the court to continue its jurisdiction after the child has left the
state.79  This principle of voluntary consent has only been applied in
probate guardianship cases. Its application to cases of guardians
appointed by courts following adjudications of delinquency, status
offenses, dependency, or neglect would clearly establish the ability of the
sending state to control out-of-state guardians.
B. Full Faith and Credit
Another principle that promotes extraterritorial recognition of out-
of-state placement orders is the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution. The clause, however, requires recognition and
enforcement of a sister state judgment only to the extent that the rendering
court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter when the decree
was made, that the court satisfied the requirements of due process, and that
the judgment rendered was a final order.80
77. 536 P.2d 923 (Okla. 1975).
78. Id. at 928.
79. The jurisdiction principal of Pfotenhauer has been codified for guardianship appointments
in some states. See, e.g., AaMz. REv. STAT. § 14-5208 (1975) and NED. REV. STAT. § 30-2612 (1975).
Both of these statutes specify that by accepting an appointment, a guardian "submits personally to the
jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the guardianship that may be instituted by any
interested person." A Committee comment following the Nebraska stztute explains the rationale for
the statute:
The "long-arm" principle behind this section is well established. It seems desirable that
the court in whiph acceptance is filed be able to serve its process on the guardian wherever he
has moved. The continuing interest of that court in the welfare of the minor is ample to
justify this provision. The consent to service is real rather than fictional in the guardianship
situation when the guardian acts voluntarily in filing acceptance.




The requirement of finality is especially significant because the
majority of out-of-state placements may not be final decisions. Juvenile
courts normally regard their jurisdiction as continuing throughout the
period of placement; thus, the full faith and credit clause might not require
enforcement by a receiving state of a sending state's initial placement
order.8'
A major problem inherent in the application of full faith and credit to
juvenile cases is that the principle is inapplicable to the enforcement of
another jurisdiction's penal judgments.8 2 Because it is unclear whether
juvenile court judgments are criminal or civil, or whether they create
penalties or duties, benefits or rights, it is problematic whether out-of-state
enforcement of juvenile judgments could be compelled by the full faith and
credit clause.
C. Long-Arm Statutes
"Long-arm" statutes permit courts to acquire personal jurisdiction
over parties outside the boundaries of a state when the cause of action
arises from the parties' activities within the state. Typical events that
activate long-arm jurisdiction are contract formation and tortious
conduct.83
In the context of interstate placement, long-armjurisdiction might be
asserted over agreements between a sending agency and a receiving facility
concerning financial arrangements, notice requirements for changes in
circumstances, and methods for the return of children to the sending
state.8 4 If such an agreement is approached as an ordinary contract, it
should be enforceable by a court of general jurisdiction. If the contract
were used to effect an out-of-state placement, a long-arm statute might give
a court in the sending state jurisdiction over enforcement of the
contractual terms.85
The difficulty is that a contract for the transfer of physical custody
over a child might not be viewed by a court as an ordinary contract. It is
not clear whether courts of general jurisdiction would accept a suit for
breach of a placement agreement because it sounded in contract, or shunt
the case to a juvenile court because custody of a juvenile was at issue.
There is also a problem of applying contract remedies to breach of
child-care agreements. In the case of a sending agency trying to enforce
such contractual terms as "standards of care' or "return of custody,"
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 109 (1971); RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 41, comment a (1942); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41, comments a,c, d & f
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 120 (1971).
83. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015 (1976).
84. For an example of a typical placement contract, see S.F. KATz, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 94
(1971).
85. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1968).
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money damages would clearly be inappropriate, and courts might hesitate
on policy grounds to order specific performance.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE PLACEMENTS:
IMPORT/EXPORT STATUTES
State codes commonly regulate the importation and exportation of
children.86 These statutes are important because they regulate interstate
placements to which the various interstate compacts do not apply, as when
one or both of the participating states does not subscribe to the compact,
or when the characteristics of the placement put it beyond the reach of the
compacts but within the scope of these import/ export statutes. Y The
import/ export statutes are also important because their penalty provisions
may be extended to compact violations.88
The import/export statutes express legislative awareness of the
problems of sending children across state lines; as rules of comity for court
and administrative placements, they establish methods for regularizing
such placements and assuring comparable state involvement in interstate
and intrastate placements. They also appear to be alternatives to the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children and the Interstate
Compact on Juveniles for regulating some interstate placements of
children. In the absence of court decisions construing these laws, it is not
possible to conclude whether they are congruent with the compacts. The
lack of decisional law suggests that the import/ export statutes are not used
extensively.
Typically, the statutes describe the regulated activity as "importation
of" and "exportation of" or "bringing or sending into" and "taking or
sending out" children. These particular words were probably used in lieu
of "immigration" or "emigration" because the laws are not directed at the
children but to the activities of their custodians. A few states have recently
adopted the phrase "interstate placement" to describe the type of activity
86. ALA. CODE tit. 38, § 38-7-15 (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 8-503 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-
51 (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 31, § 307 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 99-215 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-3-21-1
to 4 (Burns 1975); KAN. STAT. § 38-315 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199,4C0 (1975); MASS. GEN, LAWS
ANN. Ch. 119, § 36 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. § 257.05-.06 (1960); Mo. REv. STAT. § 210.010 (1976);
MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 71-711 (1961); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-704 to 709 (1975), N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 170-B:24 (1961); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 9:7-1 to 6 (1970); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 382 (McKinney
1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-50 to 55 (1972); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-12-14.1(1971); O1110 REV. CODE
ANN. § 2151.39 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 33 (West 1966); OR. REV. STAT. § 415.090
(1977); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 62, §§ 741-745 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-3 (1969); S,C. CODE § 71-207
(1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-6-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN, §§ 14-1505 to 1509 (1973); W.
VA. CODE § 49-2-15 (1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.98 (1977); Wyo. STAr. § 14-52.8 (1977),
87. So-called grey market adoptions and other placements are sometimes consciously designed
to minimize or avoid interaction with the official child-care apparatus.
88. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 2-1 (West 1973), is the provision of the Placement
Compact that incorporates by reference other state statutory penalties. The referenced statute, MASS,




regulated in these statutes,89 which suggests that import/export statutes
and interstate placement statutes may cover the same types of activity.
Typical regulatory techniques in the import/ export statutes include
performance bonds; licensing, inspection and reporting requirements by
receiving agencies; and specific prohibitions against the importation of
certain types of children. The statutes reflect legislative concern that the
state child-care apparatus be accessible to all children in the state,
regardless of their geographical origin.90
A. Importation
By far the most common regulatory statute circumscribes the
importation of children. While the scope of these laws is usually limited to
adoption, the import statutes are discussed here because the meaning of
the phrase "placement for adoption" is ambiguous. The legal meaning of
"placement for adoption" could be based on the intent of the party placing
a child or of the receiving party; it might be based on the child's legal status
or his relationship with his parents; or it could refer to the legal
relationship between a placed child and the placing custodian.
In many "placement for adoption" statutes, the place is not
89. GA. CODE ANN. § 99-211(b)(3) (1976); Wis. STAT. § 48.98 (1977).
90. Alabama's statute typifies the techniques of regulation found in import statutes:
(a) No person or agency shall bring or send any child into the state of Alabama for the
purpose of placing him or procuring his adoption or placing him in any chi W-care facility, as
defined herein, without first obtaining the consent of the department. The department shall
have the power to impose and enforce reasonable conditions precedent to the granting ofsuch
consent. Such conditions shall be for the purposes of providing thesamecare and protection
for the child coming into the state of Alabama for placement or adoption as are afforded to a
child who is born in the state of Alabama. ...
ALA. CODE tit. 38, § 38-7-15 (1975). The statute enumerates conditions that give the department
authority to inspect proposed adoptive parents' and foster parents' homes and to receive information
about the child from out-of-state agencies, then proceeds to regulate other placements:
(5) The department shall be authorized to make a thorough investigation of any child-care
facility to which any child is being brought or sent to determine conformity to minimum
standards prescribed herein for approval or licensing and to determine the suitability ofsuch
child-care facility for the care, supervision, training and control of said child;
(6) in case said child, subsequent to being brought into the state of Alabama, becomes
dependent, neglected, or delinquent prior to his adoption or becoming of legal age of
majority, said child shall be subject to the laws of the state ofAlabama as ifhe were a resident
of the state;
(7) the child will be placed in conformity with the rules and regulations of the department;
(8) the person with whom the child is placed shall be responsible for his proper care and
training,
(9) the department shall have the right of visitation and supervision of the child and the
home or the child-care facility in which he is placed until adoption becomes final or the child
becomes 18 years of age;
(10) the department may, pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, prescribe the
conditions of an agreement or contract with the designated out-of-state agency, when a child
is brought into the state of Alabama.
(b) The person or agency receiving the child in Alabama shall report to the department at
such reasonable times as the department may direct, as to the location and well-being of the
child, so long as he shall remain within the state and until he shall have reached the age of 18
years or shall have been legally adopted.
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mentioned; it might be an orphanage, a group home or a family home. 91
In the case of a placement into a family home, when all of the parties
agree that a child will remain in the home and be adopted, and an adoption
actually occurs, the situation is readily understood to be a "placement for
adoption," based on the intent of the participating parties. When a child is
placed in an orphanage or a group home, however, the intent might be to
place the child only until adopting parents can be found or until an
adoption actually takes place. The South Carolina Attorney General has
interpreted that state's import law to apply to placements subsequent to
the termination of parental rights "regardless of whether, where or when
an adoption proceeding is actually begun. 92
State legislatures used varied language to describe the kinds of
importation placements that are regulated. In the absence of case law, the
scope of the several statutes can be compared only on the basis of the
statutory language. Among the twenty-nine states that have importation
statutes,93 there are sixteen different descriptions of the regulated
placements ranging from the very broad ("for care or supervision")94 to the
specific (placement in a "family home").95
The various phrasings of the import statutes uniformly indicate
legislative intent to regulate broad ranges of individuals. A typical
phrasing includes within the statutory coverage "any person, corporation,
association or institution. 9 6 It is likely, despite different wording, that the
import statutes all reach similar groups of individuals.
A few statutes specifically assert their applicability to placements by
officials of other states.91 Other child importation statutes contain
qualifications limiting applicability to specified categories of sending
agencies. Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska limit the application of their
importation statute to "associations incorporated in another state." 98 By
implication, unincorporated associations, unincorporated child-care
organizations, parents or officials do not come within the coverage of these
statutes.
Most of the importation statutes exclude from coverage interstate
placements by relatives, relatives by blood or marriage, or relatives with
specified degrees of kinship or relationship. 99 North Dakota excludes
91. E.g.. GA. CODE ANN. § 99-215 (1976).
92. 1970-71 Op. ATr'Y GEN. No. 3217 (S.C. 1970-71).
93. See note 86 supra.
94. ILL. REV. STAT. § 17-51 (1968).
95. OR. REV. STAT. § 418.290 (1977).
96. IND. CODE § 12-3-21-1 (1975).
97 See notes 70-72 supra.
98. KAN. STAT. § 38-315 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.010 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-704
(1975).
99. Eg.. IN . CODE § 12-3-21-5 (1975) ("relatives"); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch, 119, § 36 (West
1973) ("blood or marriage"); MINN. STAT. § 257.05(2) (1960) (specified relatives).
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from regulation placements by relatives or guardians, provided the
guardian is not an agency.)° New Jersey excludes placements with
relatives in their own home, but if an interstate child is subsequently re-
placed, the normal import regulations apply.101 Connecticut excludes
placements to any summer camp operating less than 90 days, and to any
educational institution.0 2
B. Exportation
The export statutes, like their more numerous import counterparts,
regulate diverse activities. Again, in the absence of case law, it is possible
that the activities reached by the export statutes may actually be broader
than is apparent from the statutory phrasing. The activities regulated in
the statutes are described as exportation "for adoption,"'10 3 "to place in a
family home,"10' 4 "to place in a foster home or in a child-caring
institution,"'0 5 and "for foster care placement.'
0 6
As with the importation statutes, different categories of individuals
are regulated or excluded from regulation by the exportation statutes.
Florida requires everyone except "an agency or the department" to
comply with its exportation requirements;'0 7 Minnesota excludes only
parents and guardians from exportation regulation; Nebraska also
excludes persons with a "right to dispose" of a child.'0 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The interstate placement of children is a common practice that has not
been closely scrutinized by courts or legislatures. Apart from interstate
compacts,'0 9 development of a body of law to control official and unofficial
out-of-state placements has been rudimentary.
Recent fourteenth amendment challenges to out-of-state placements
reflect the contemporary concern for individual rights of juveniles.
Complex issues of due process and equal protection have been raised,
including right to treatment and right of association." 0
Most statutory authority for court or executive agency placements of
children does not mention geographic limitations. A few states have
100. N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-12-14.1 (1971).
101. N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:7-4 (1970).
102. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-51(2) (1975).
103. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.207 (West 1969).
104. MINN. STAT. § 257.06 (1960).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110.52 (1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-1508 (1973).
106. VA. CODE § 63.1-207.1 (1973).
107. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.207 (West 1969).
108. MINN. STAT. § 257.06 (1960); NEB. REv. STAT..§ 43-215 (1975).
109. See notes I & 2 and accompanying text supra.
110. See text accompanying notes 9-28 supra.
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statutes expressly authorizing interstate placements by courts1ll or
executive agencies.' 2  A few states, such as Michigan, 1 3 expressly
authorize international placements. Recent judicial decisions have
construed statutes that contain no express geographic limitation on
placement authority to permit interstate placements." 4 This attitude
contrasts with the earlier tendency to construe ambiguous statutes as
forbidding placements beyond state boundaries.
Various legal doctrines appear to be available to support out-of-state
enforcement of judicial interstate placement orders. Although specific
case law is minimal, the doctrines of full faith and credit, comity, and
extraterritorial "long-arm" jurisdiction could be invoked to support the
legality and enforceability of interstate placement orders.
The majority of states have a statutory basis for administrative
regulation of interstate placements in their ch4d importation and
exportation laws. Although these statutes appear to have developed in
response to legislative concern with informal interstate placements,
several' 5 seem clearly applicable to official interstate placements.
111. See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 57-62 supra.
113. See note 60 supra.
114. See note 34 supra.
115. Because there has been no judicial construction of the import/export statutes it is unclear
whether they are all applicable to official interstate placements by courts and executive agencies See
text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
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